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self-managed teams is associated with increased intra-firm wage inequality between skilled 
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role. While teamwork interacts positively with employer-provided further training and a 
production technology of the most recent vintage, it interacts negatively with the age of the 
establishment and the coverage by a collective bargaining agreement. 
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1. Introduction 
Teamwork is a key feature of high performance work (HPW) systems. The literature on HPW 
practices has grown rapidly in the last decade or so, and by now we have a rich collection of 
evidence on these practices. Yet, most of studies examine the effects on firm performance. 
Relatively little is known about the wage effects of HPW practices. As Handel and Levine 
(2004: 3) put it:  
‘Many of the early studies focused on the implications of new work 
practices for organizational outcomes such as productivity and 
profitability, where the evidence remains mixed.… Untily quite 
recently, systematic research on the implications for employees has 
been less common, and the evidence remains at least very mixed.’ 
We contribute to the literature by examining the relationship between self-managed teams and 
intra-firm wage dispersion among blue-collar workers. The literature on skill-biased 
technological change usually views blue-collar workers as a homogeneous indicator of low-
skilled employees. Yet, not only technological change but also organizational change can be 
skill-biased. Team production involves increased responsibility, expanded involvement in 
decision making, and more complex tasks. Hence, it entails higher skill requirements. Blue-
collar workers are those workers who are directly involved in team production. This suggests 
that it is important to distinguish between skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. 
  Using data on a sample of manufacturing establishments in Germany, we find that the 
use of self-managed teams is associated with increased intra-firm wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. This finding fits the hypothesis that skilled blue-
collar workers play a crucial role in team production. We argue that teamwork involves an 
increased specialization of unskilled and skilled blue-collar workers within establishments. 
Team production implies that skilled blue-collar workers have an increased responsibility for 
complex and difficult tasks while possibly only routine tasks are left for unskilled blue-collar 
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workers. Hence, the employer has an increased incentive to provide differential rewards to 
skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. 
  Moreover, we take into account that the link between team production and intra-firm 
wage inequality may vary according to circumstances and the type of firm. While the 
literature on HPW practices and establishment performance routinely emphasizes the role of 
interaction effects, the literature on the wage effects of HPW practices has been essentially 
silent on the role of moderating factors. Almost all of the studies implicitly assume a uniform 
relationship between HPW practices and wages. This may explain the  mixed results in this 
literature. 
  Our results highlight four interaction effects. First, the use of self-managed teams 
interacts positively with employer-provided further training. Such an interaction effect can be 
expected if team production widens the training gap between skilled and unskilled workers. 
As skilled blue-collar workers play an important role in team production, the employer is 
likely to invest an even larger amount in their training. This reinforces the rise in wage 
inequality. Second, self-managed teams interact positively with a production technology of 
the most recent vintage. New production technologies substitute for routine tasks and require 
skilled workers with increased responsibility to run and operate them. Hence, a state-of-the-
art technology reinforces the role of skilled team members. Third, the use of self-managed 
teams interacts negatively with the age of the establishment. Older establishments with 
inflexible routines and a more bureaucratic organization may face difficulties in finding new 
pay policies that complement team production. Fourth, self-managed teams interact 
negatively with the coverage by a collective bargaining agreement. Collective agreements are 
usually negotiated between unions and employers’ association on a broad industrial level. As 
they define a lower bound on wages, the negative interaction effect suggests that collective 
agreements prevent a downward adjustment in unskilled wages. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a detailed discussion of 
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the theoretical background. Section 3 provides a review of previous empirical studies. Section 
4 describes the data and variables. Section 5 presents the results while Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background Discussion 
2.1 Teamwork and Wage Inequality within Establishments 
Since the 1970s wage dispersion has been dramatically rising in the United States. The large 
increase in inequality has resulted from both higher skilled wages and lower unskilled wages. 
In contrast, in many continental European countries, most notably in Germany, the 
distribution of wages was very stable for a long time (Freeman and Katz 1995). The picture 
has changed recently. In the meantime, even Germany experienced an increase in wage 
dispersion, starting in the early 1990s (Gernadt and Pfeiffer 2006, Kohn 2006, Moller 2005). 
  Rising wage inequality is usually attributed to skill-biased technological change. 
According to this view, new technologies substitute for unskilled workers in routine tasks 
while they complement skilled workers in performing complex nonroutine tasks (Acemoglu 
2002, Autor et al. 2003, Galor and Moav 2000). The resulting rise in wage dispersion may be 
reinforced if new technologies lead firms to invest more in the training of skilled workers and 
to reallocate physical capital from unskilled to skilled jobs. However, the wage effects of 
technological change can depend critically on the type of technology being adopted. Doms et 
al. (1997) show that computer investments are associated with skill upgrading while factory 
automation technologies directly used in the production of manufactured goods have little 
influence. This might suggest that skill-biased technological change increases the skill 
requirements for managerial and clerical employees rather than for production workers.
1
  While the earlier literature has mainly focused on technological change, a few recent 
studies stress that also organizational change can be skill-biased (Bresnahan et al. 2002, 
Caroli and Van Reenen 2001). This change is characterized by an increasing use of HPW 
practices. The delegation of decision rights and the decentralization of authority aim at 
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improving the flexible use of local information available at lower layers of hierarchy (Aoki 
1990). This entails higher skill requirements for lower-level employees as they increasingly 
have to engage in more complex tasks. Importantly, the use of HPW practices involves a 
reorganization of work at the shop floor level. Hence, skill-biased organizational change also 
applies to blue-collar workers. 
  Organizing blue-collar workers in self-managed production teams with increased 
responsibility and expanded involvement in decision making is typically viewed as a key 
feature of HPW systems (Osterman 1994). This brings us to the issue of skill diversity among 
team members. Theoretical models by Acemoglu (1999), Kremer and Maskin (1996) and 
Thesmar and Thoenig (2000) suggest that technological and organizational change leads to an 
increased segregation of the labor market with skilled workers being predominantly employed 
in establishments with teamwork and low-skilled workers primarily employed in traditional 
establishments without teamwork. 
  However, evidence provided by Hamilton et al. (2003) shows that skill diversity is 
advantageous. They examine a garment factory in which sewing initially was divided into 
independent tasks. The factory changed the organization of its sewing activity to module 
production, in which autonomous teams perform all sewing tasks. Hamilton et al. (2003) find 
that heterogeneous teams are more productive, with average ability held constant.
2
  This evidence complements several theoretical analyses. As heterogeneous team 
members have different backgrounds, experiences and heuristics, the team can exploit new 
opportunities (Hong et al. 2004, Lazear 1999, Mello and Ruckes 2006, Prat 2002). Diversity 
in skills and abilities allows the team to draw on different sources of information and enables 
creative problem solving. Thus, a heterogeneous team of workers with different skills and 
levels of skills can outperform a homogeneous team of high-skilled workers with similar 
backgrounds. 
  Furthermore, heterogeneous teams facilitate communication and mutual help among 
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low-skilled and high-skilled workers. This may enable a more efficient specialization of low-
skilled and high-skilled team members.
3 If there is little opportunity for communication, low-
skilled wokers cannot fully pass problems to high-skilled colleagues. Hence, to some extent, 
they have to solve those problems on their own. Yet, if teamwork provides opportunities for 
communication, low-skilled team members can ask their high-skilled colleagues for help to 
solve difficult tasks. In exchange, high-skilled workers delegate routine tasks to low-skilled 
team members. This allows high-skilled workers to focus on the more complex tasks as they 
get disburdened from routine work. Hence, while teamwork involves a flattening of formal 
hierarchies within firms, it may also entail an increased specialization of unskilled and skilled 
blue-collar workers at the shop floor level. 
  This line of reasoning suggests that skilled workers play a crucial role in the 
performance of heterogeneous teams. They have increased responsibility for complex tasks 
and help low-skilled workers to handle difficulties (Hansen 1997). Similarly, Bell and Hart 
(1999) argue that high-skilled workers do overtime to clear faults of other team members or to 
perform the tasks of colleagues who are absent due to illness. This is important as teams are 
characterized by a high degree of interdependent worker productivity (Heywood and Jirjahn 
2004). The performance of a single worker does not only affect the worker’s own output but 
also the entire team. 
  Moreover, high-skilled workers can play a leadership role within heterogeneous teams. 
Aghion et al. (1999) argue that the managers of the firm concentrate delegated decision rights 
on a small number of high-skilled team leaders to avoid moral hazard. Team production as a 
coordination game may, indeed, involve multiple equilibria. A leader can help to reach a high 
effort equilibrium by coordinating the complementary actions of the team members (Foss 
2001). Leading by example (exerting high effort) may be one way in which the leader creates 
the common belief that the team will indeed move to the high effort equilibrium. High-skilled 
workers may also establish a group norm of high productivity by exerting pressure on low-
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skilled workers. Experimental evidence by Falk and Ichino (2006) indicates that low-skilled 
workers are very sensitive to peer effects. This is confirmed by a case study by Mas and 
Moretti (2006). Furthermore, like Hamilton et al. (2003), Mas and Moretti (2006) also show 
that skill diversity is associated with increased performance. 
  If skilled workers play a crucial role in the success of teams, incentives are required to 
particularly ensure that skilled team members exert effort. Hence, it appears reasonable to the 
firm to provide differential rewards to skilled and unskilled team members. This means that 
skilled team members receive larger rewards for good team performance than unskilled team 
members.
4 Jirjahn and Kraft (2007) confirm that group performance pay as a proxy for 
underlying team production has a stronger positive impact on productivity when coupled with 
a higher wage differential between skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. Of course, team 
production may make it difficult for the firm to identify individual contributions (Alchian and 
Demsetz 1972). However, differential rewards for group performance can be based on 
observable worker characteristics such as qualification or training. Jones and Kato (2004) find 
that the screening of team members by management improves the performance effect of 
teams. Screening requires additional monitoring (in order to know which workers to select) 
and, hence, provides valuable information about the team members’ initial skills and abilities. 
This information can be used to reward workers differently for good team performance. 
  Alternatively, teamwork may result in higher efficiency wages for skilled workers.
5 
One can argue, in the style of Ramaswamy and Rowthorne (1991), that the ‘damage potential’ 
of the individual worker influences the efficiency wage paid to this worker. The employer will 
pay a higher efficiency wage to workers with a higher damage potential in order to reduce 
their incentive to inflict damage on production. As skilled workers play a crucial role in team 
production, they are likely to have a disproportionately high potential to disrupt teamwork. 
Moreover, it can be argued that team production is particularly associated with increased task 
complexity for skilled workers. Hence, it lowers the probability that a skilled worker is caught 
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shirking. As a consequence, the firm has to increase skilled workers’ wages to ensure their 
effort. Clearly, an efficiency wage explanation pressuposes that the probability of detecting 
shirking is only reduced and does not drop to zero under team production. While teamwork 
might make an ‘objective’ assessment of individual effort difficult, the employer can use 
subjective evaluations by superiors to assess individual worker effort.
6 Findings by Heywood 
et al. (2007) support the notion that subjective performance evaluations are a strategic 
response to the incentive problems associated with teamwork. The presence of self-managed 
teams is positively associated with both the use of performance appraisals by supervisors and 
the share of workers who are subject to performance appraisals. Such performance appraisals 
ensure a minimum probability of detecting shirking on the job.
7
  Altogether, we anticipate that firms using self-managed teams exhibit greater wage 
dispersion among blue-collar workers because these firms provide disproportionately higher 
incentives to skilled team members. The rise in intra-firm wage dispersion is reinforced if 
teamwork results in lower wages for unskilled blue-collar workers. As outlined above, 
teamwork may entail an increased specialization of skilled and unskilled workers. Such a 
specialization leaves only routine and menial tasks for unskilled workers, reducing the 
necessity to pay high wages to these workers. However, one might argue that even unskilled 
workers could gain from teamwork. If skilled team members provide expertise and help, the 
productivity of their unskilled colleagues may rise, resulting in higher unskilled wages. Yet, 
as long as skilled workers play a disproportionate role in the success of teams, skilled wages 
will rise more than unskilled wages. Thus, even in this situation, teamwork will be associated 
with increased intra-firm wage inequality between skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. 
  This hypothesis contrasts with the view that teamwork requires a more egalitarian 
wage structure. According to the ‘fair wage-effort’ hypothesis by Akerlof and Yellen (1990), 
workers withdraw effort if their actual wage falls short of the wage the workers themselves 
consider as fair. Akerlof and Yellen postulate that the fair wage is determined as a weighted 
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average of the wages of a reference group. Levine (1991) puts foreward this argument by 
stressing that particularly team production gives rise to social comparisons as it increases 
social interactions among workers. Therefore, in firms where team production is important a 
more egalitarian wage structure might result in higher group cohesiveness and increased 
productivity. However, even if fairness considerations play an important role in team 
production, this may not necessarily imply that workers prefer an egalitarian wage structure. 
Frey et al. (2004) emphasize that workers are often not only concerned with the outcomes, but 
also with the ways these outcomes are determined. They argue that procedural justice is a 
source of worker utility.
8 Hence, team members may accept unequal wages if the process of 
determining pay accords with procedural fairness norms. Differential rewards based on skills 
are likely to accord with such norms. This may be particularly the case in a situation where 
skilled workers help low-skilled workers improve their performance. 
  While we anticipate a positive relationship between self-managed production teams 
and intra-firm wage dispersion, we also stress that moderating factors are very likely to play a 
role in the strength of this relationship. In what follows, we hypothesize that teamwork 
interacts with employer-provided further training, production technology, establishment age 
and industrial relations. 
 
2.2 The Moderating Role of Employer-Provided Further Training 
Empirical studies have shown a strong, albeit not perfect link, between the use of self-
managed teams and employer-provided further training (Black and Lynch 1998, Gerlach and 
Jirjahn 2001). This confirms the notion that teamwork is associated with increased skill 
requirements. Workers perform a broader set of tasks, and delegating decisions to them 
presupposes that they comprehend important elements of the production process. Social 
interaction is greater, and workers need to be trained in social competences. 
  Previous research has also confirmed that not all workers are equally likely to receive 
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training. Skilled workers receive a higher amount of training. Employer-provided further 
training appears to be complementary to the workers’ initial skills. Our discussion suggests 
that teamwork will increase the training gap between unskilled and skilled workers. As skilled 
workers play a crucial role in the performance of teams, they will receive an even more 
disproportionate amount of training under team production. This reinforces their crucial role 
and widens the inequality among skilled and unskilled team members. Altogether, we 
hypothesize that team production will have an even stronger impact on intra-firm wage 
dispersion among blue-collar workers when it is coupled with employer-provided further 
training. Or put slightly differently, teamwork and employer-provided further training should 
interact positively with respect to intra-firm wage dispersion. 
 
2.3 The Moderating Role of Production Technology 
The vintage of production technology is also likely to play a moderating role. New production 
technologies partially substitute for routine tasks. This leads to even more menial tasks for 
unskilled team members and helps skilled team members to even more focus on complex 
tasks. Moreover, more complicated production technologies require skilled workers with 
increased responsibility to run and operate these technologies.
9 This even further strengthens 
the role skilled workers play in team production. Hence, the effect of self-managed teams on 
intra-firm wage dispersion among blue-collar workers is likely to be stronger when team 
production is coupled a with a production technology of the most recent vintage. 
  This line of reasoning has also implications for earlier studies on technological 
change. Doms et al. (1997) found that new production technologies have little influence on 
the skill requirements for production workers. However, the effects of technological change 
may depend on the organization of work. New production technologies may have no or even a 
deskilling effect on blue-collar workers when there is no reorganization of work and 
production workers have little scope for decision making. Only new technologies coupled 
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with increased responsibilites and expanded involvment in decision making are likely to 
increase the skill requirements for blue-collar workers. 
 
2.4 The Moderating Role of Establishment Age 
Empirical findings by Ichniowski and Shaw (1995) indicate that older firms are less likely to 
adopt innovative HPW systems. We hypothesize that even if an older firm implements team 
production, it may face difficulties in adopting a complementary pay policy. First, changes in 
personnel management policies require organizational learning processes. As learning is 
predominantly cumulative and closely related the firm’s previous experiences (Teece et al. 
1994), older firms with a more bureaucratic organization and established routines and 
heuristics are less likely to find new policies they are not familiar with. Second, worker 
resistance may cause higher adjustment costs (Milgrom and Roberts 1995). Our previous 
discussion suggests that unskilled workers may lose from teamwork. They are likely to have 
more opportunites to resist a change in pay policy if the firm is older. Seniority rights may 
protect uncooperative workers from sanctions. Altogether, we anticipate a positive effect of 
teamwork on wage dispersion in younger firms and a less clear effect in older firms. 
 
2.5 The Moderating Role of Industrial Relations 
German industrial relations are characterized by a dual structure of employee representation 
with both works councils and unions (Hubler and Jirjahn 2003). Collective agreements are 
usually negotiated between unions and employers’ associations on a broad industrial level. 
They regulate wage rates and general aspects of the employment contract such as working 
hours. Typically, establishments are covered by an agreement if they are members of an 
employers’ association.
10 The agreement can be extended also to non-member establishments 
by the Federal Ministry of Labor. Covered establishments usually pay the negotiated wage 
rate to both union and non-union members (Fitzenberger and Franz 1999). 
  Studies from Anglo-Saxon countries show that union contracts reduce wage dispersion 
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among workers covered by these contracts (Card et al. 2004, Freeman 1980). Yet, it is not 
clear if this relationship holds in countries with higher degrees of centralization in collective 
bargaining. Collective agreements negotiated by unions and employers’ associations define 
minimum standards. Covered firms are free to pay wages above the level specified by an 
agreement. The resulting wage drift may diminish the equalizing effect of collective 
agreements. While collective bargaining at the sectoral level tends to reduce wage dispersion, 
this effect can be offset by wage supplements paid unilaterally by the firms (Cardoso and 
Portugal 2005, Dell’ Aringa and Pagani 2007, Hartog et al. 2002). This line of reasoning 
presupposes that firms pay disproportionate wage supplements to skilled workers. 
  However, employers may prefer to reduce the wages of their unskilled employees. In 
that case, covered firms exhibit downward wage rigidity as the minimum wages set by 
collective bargaining agreements are binding (Kahn 2000). Indeed, survey evidence provided 
by Franz and Pfeiffer (2006) confirms that collective agreements are an important reason for 
downward rigidity of low-skilled wages in Germany. Hence, collective bargaining coverage 
may be associated with lower intra-firm wage dispersion if employers want to cut the wages 
of their low-skilled workers. This brings us to an issue which is largely neglected in the 
empirical literature on collective bargaining and wage dispersion. Insofar employers differ in 
their propensity to reduce the wages of their low-skilled employees, there will be no uniform 
relationship between collective bargaining coverage and intra-firm wage dispersion. The 
relationship will vary according to circumstances and type of firm.
11 We hypothesize that 
collective bargaining coverage under certain circumstances may interact with teamwork. 
  If teamwork predominantly requires higher wages for skilled workers, there will be 
little interaction between collective bargaining coverage and the use of self-managed teams. 
As collective agreements only define a lower bound on wages, firms using self-managed 
teams are free to pay wage supplements to high-skilled team members. Hence, the 
relationship between teamwork and intra-firm wage dispersion should not differ between 
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covered and uncovered firms. However, collective bargaining coverage may negatively 
interact with the use of self-managed teams if teamwork requires both higher wages for 
skilled team members and substantially lower wages for unskilled team members. Uncovered 
firms can realize both higher skilled wages and lower unskilled wages. In contrast, covered 
establishments can only realize higher wages for skilled team members. The lower bound on 
wages set by collective agreements is likely to prevent a downward adjustment in unskilled 
wages. Thus, teamwork will have a less strong effect on intra-firm wage dispersion if the firm 
is covered by a collective agreement. Such a negative interaction effect might explain the 
finding by Gerlach et al. (1998) that establishments with self-managed teams are more likely 
to escape collective bargaining.  
  German works councils provide a highly developed mechanism for establishment level 
codetermination. Their rights are laid down in the Works Constitution Act. The law states that 
councils shall be elected by the workforce of establishments with five or more employees. 
However, their creation depends on the initiative of the workforce. Hence, councils are not 
present in all eligible establishments. Works councils have functions that are distinct from 
those of unions. They are an institution designed to foster communication between employees 
and management and to build trustful and cooperative industrial relations within 
establishments (Smith 1991, Freeman and Lazear 1995). The intended purpose of this 
institution is to create joint establishment surplus rather than to redistribute it. Wage 
negotiations between councils and management are not allowed. 
  However, councils can use their codetermination rights to obtain employer 
concessions on issues where they have no legal powers. If employer and works council fail to 
reach an agreement in informal wage negotiations, the council can threaten to be 
uncooperative in areas where its consent is necessary. Empirical studies routinely confirm that 
works councils have an influence on wages. Most importantly, there is evidence that works 
councils are associated with reduced intra-firm wage dispersion (Hubler and Meyer 2001). 
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Moreover, councils appear to have a stronger productivity-enhancing effect in establishments 
with low intra-firm wage dispersion (Jirjahn and Kraft 2007). These findings fit the notion 
that wage inequality undermines the functioning and bargaining strength of works councils. 
Hence, one may hypothesize that works councils will oppose the rising wage inequality 
associated with team production. The use of self-managed teams should have a less strong 
impact on intra-firm wage dispersion when a works council is present. 
 
3. Previous Empirical Studies 
While the link between firm performance and HPW practices such as teams has been widely 
examined, there is only a small number of studies on the wage effects of teamwork (see 
Handel and Levine 2004 for a review). In particular, there is very little research on the 
relationship between teams and the wage structure within establishments. Using employee 
data, Bailey et al. (2001) provide descriptive statistics for the US. They find that there is more 
variation in earnings among workers participating in self-managed teams than among workers 
not participating in teams. However, Bailey et al. (2001) do not address the question whether 
teamwork increases wage dispersion within or between establishments. Based on linked 
employer-employee data, Bauer and Bender (2001) show for Germany that the introduction of 
self-managed teams is associated with increased wage dispersion within establishments.
12 The 
introduction of teams increases the differential between the 80
th and the 20
th and the 50
th and 
the 20
th percentile of the intra-firm wage distribution. These important findings raise the 
question which types of workers are affected by teamwork. 
  Some studies use US establishment data to examine the link between teams and wages 
for different occupational groups within establishments. These studies consider production 
workers as a homogeneous group. Capelli (1996) finds that self-managed teams are associated 
with both higher average pay for production workers and higher average pay for supervisors. 
The results are largely confirmed by Capelli and Carter (2000). However, Black et al. (2004), 
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working with the same data, find a positive association between self-managed teams and the 
average wage of supervisors only in unionized but not in nonunionized establishments. 
Moreover, they obtain the result that self-managed teams have no influence on the average 
pay for production workers. A study by Osterman (2000) shows even a negative link between 
teams and the average wage of workers directly involved in production. Altogether, the few 
available studies provide mixed results on the relationship between self-managed teams and 
the wages of production workers. One reason for these mixed findings may be that production 
workers are no homogeneous group. The relationship between teams and wages may differ 
between unskilled and skilled production workers. Moreover, the relationship may vary 
according to circumstances and the type of establishment. 
  Osterman (2006) examines the link between HPW practices and wage inequality 
among blue-collar workers directly involved in production. Using an index of various HPW 
practices, he finds that HPW practices have no influence on within-establishment wage 
disperion.
13 However, as indicated by his earlier study (Osterman 2000), HPW practices can 
differ in their wage effects. Hence, it appears to be interesting to examine the wage effects of 
specific HPW practices such as teamwork. 
 Finally,  Hamilton  et al. (2003) report in their case study of a garment plant that while 
most sewers experienced a pay increase after joining a team, sewers at the top end of the pay 
distribution experienced a reduction in hourly pay under teamwork. This raises the question if 
the findings of this case study carry over to other circumstances and types of establishments. 
For example, as noted by Hamilton et al. (2003: 494ff) themselves, the presence of a union 
might have influenced the link between team production and wages. 
  As our brief review makes clear, the empirical literature reports mixed results on the 
relationship between teams and wage dispersion within establishments. Moreover, the 
literature on the wage effects of teams is essentially silent on the role of moderating factors. 
Hence, more evidence is certainly warranted. 
   15
 
4. Data and Variables 
4.1 Data Set 
The data are drawn from the fourth, 1997, wave of the Hanover Panel (Gerlach et al. 2003). 
The Hanover Panel is a four-wave panel with data from manufacturing establishments in the 
federal state of Lower Saxony, a highly industrial area of Germany. The population of the 
survey consists of all manufacturing establishments with five or more employees. The sample 
is stratified according to establishment size and industry, with an oversampling of larger 
establishments. The sample was designed in such a way that a sufficient number of cell 
entries remained after four waves despite sample attrition. Observations were drawn randomly 
for each cell. The Hanover Panel was financed by the Volkswagen Foundation. Interviews 
were conducted by Infratest Sozialforschung, a professional survey and opinion institute. The 
data were collected on the basis of a questionnaire in personal interviews with the owner, top 
manager or head of the personnel department. In the first wave (fall 1994), 51 percent of the 
establishments in the sample agreed to participate. In spite of this non-response rate the data 
are representative of the manufacturing establishments in Lower Saxony in 1994 and in the 
subsequent years. Apart from basic information on the establishment additional topics were 
covered in successive waves. The fourth wave contains information on intra-firm wage 
dispersion among blue-collar workers.
14
 
4.2 Dependent Variable 
Table 1 shows the definition of the variables and their descriptive statistics.
15 The dependent 
variable is the percentage difference between the highest effective hourly wage of a skilled 
blue-collar worker and the lowest effective hourly wage of an unskilled blue-collar worker. 
On average, the difference is about 37 percent. The median equals 30 percent. Skilled blue-
collar workers are those blue-collar workers who have completed an apprenticeship training 
after graduating from a general secondary school. The distinctive feature of the German 
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apprenticeship system is its dual structure (Winkelmann 1996). Apprentices typically attend 
publicly-funded vocational part-time schools 1–2 days a week in addition to working and 
learning at the workplace. Employers bear the cost of within-firm training voluntarily. The 
apprenticeship training ends after 2–3.5 years. Detailed curricula are developed in cooperation 
with state institutions, employer organizations and trade unions. Regionally organized 
chambers of commerce and chambers of crafts coordinate and administer the programs. 
 
4.3 Explanatory Variables 
The data provide a rich set of explanatory variables. Controlling for a variety of establishment 
characteristics is important as wages are not simply determined by the demand and supply 
conditions in the external labor market. Employers pursue their own remuneration policy. 
Groshen (1991) provides evidence that wages vary substantially across establishments. We 
examine the factors influencing the distribution of wages within establishments and, hence, 
stress that also the intra-firm wage inequality between given skill groups can systematically 
differ across employers. 
  The explanatory variable of primary interest is a dichotomous indicator of whether 
blue-collar workers are organized in production teams with expanded involvement in 
decision-making and increased responsibility. 40 percent of establishments reported that their 
blue-collar workers are organized in self-managed teams. Based on our theoretical 
considerations, we anticipate that the use of self-managed teams is positively associated with 
intra-firm wage inequality between skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. However, our 
hypotheses also imply that moderating factors may play a role in the relationship between 
self-managed teams and wage dispersion. We anticipate that team production interacts 
positively with state-of-the-art technologies and employer-provided further training, and 
negatively with works council presence, collective bargaining coverage and establishment 
age. The variable capturing technology is a dummy equal to 1 if the production technology is 
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of the most recent vintage. Employer-provided further training is captured by training 
expenditures per employee. Furthermore, we include dummy variables for works council 
incidence, collective bargaining coverage and establishments founded before 1960. 
  The interaction of works council presence with collective bargaining coverage is also 
taken into account. Hubler and Jirjahn (2003) show that works councils have a less strong 
influence on the average wage level of establishments covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement. This indicates that centralized collective bargaining reduces distributional 
conflicts on the establishment level. Rent-seeking activies of works councils are more 
restricted in covered establishments. Applying this line of reasoning to intra-firm wage 
dispersion, it can be expected that works councils will have a less strong influence on the 
structure of wages if the establishment is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. 
  The managerial environment is captured by a dummy equal to 1 if the executive 
managers of the establishment have a profit sharing plan. Bandiera et al. (2007) and Groves et 
al. (1994) show that managerial profit sharing is associated with increased intra-firm wage 
dispersion among workers in lower tiers of hierarchy. Implementing differential incentives for 
skilled and unskilled workers can be personally costly to managers. To avoid contentions with 
the workers and dissatisfaction among those not receiving higher pay, managers have to spend 
effort to ensure that increased wage inequality accords with procedural fairness norms. 
Managerial profit sharing provides a positive inducement to bear the personal costs involved 
in implementing efficiency wages or performance evaluation systems. Moreover, profit 
sharing may induce managers to target their effort and support to skilled workers, implying a 
higher productivity differential and, hence, increased wage inequality between skilled and 
unskilled workers. 
  We also include a variable for the interaction of managerial profit sharing and works 
council presence. Previous research has shown that the effect of managerial profit sharing on 
firm performance depends on the presence of a works council (Jirjahn 2003). Managerial 
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profit sharing and works council incidence may also interact with respect to intra-firm wage 
dispersion. If wage inequality undermines the functioning and bargaining strength of works 
councils, they are likely to oppose management attempts to provide differential rewards. 
Hence, managerial profit sharing may have a less strong effect on wage dispersion if a works 
council is present. 
  Furthermore, the data provide some information on the method of pay for employees 
other than executives. We include a dummy equal to 1 if the establishment uses piece rates in 
its production department. While there exist a variety of pay-for-performance schemes, piece 
rates are an incentive scheme quite often analyzed in the literature (for a review see Heywood 
and Jirjahn 2006). Several studies confirm a positive association between piece rates and 
wage dispersion (Lazear 2000, Seiler 1984, Shearer 2004). Moreover, a dummy for non-
managerial profit sharing is included. There is an ongoing discussion whether profit sharing is 
a supplement or substitute to workers’ base pay (Kruse 1993). If the link between profit 
sharing and base pay differs between skilled and unskilled workers, profit sharing might have 
an effect on our measure of intra-firm wage dispersion. 
  Studies by Black and Strahan (2001), Guadalupe (2007) and Wozniak (2007) show 
that product market competition has an influence on the structure of wages within industries. 
Competition may also influence wage dispersion within establishments. However, from a 
theoretical view point, the effect is ambiguous. On the one hand, product market competition 
may induce managers to improve the establishment’s competiveness by reducing unskilled 
wages and providing stronger incentives for skilled workers. This implies a positive link 
between competition and intra-firm wage dispersion. On the other hand, higher product 
market competition decreases non-competitive rents. If skilled workers have stronger 
bargaining power than unskilled workers, they will capture a larger share of the non-
competitive rents associated with low competition. Hence, increased product market 
competition may involve larger wage losses for skilled workers than for unskilled workers. 
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This implies a negative link between product market competition and intra-firm wage 
disperision. We capture the nature of product market competition by the sales of the the six 
largest companies as a share of total sales in the industry. Official German statistics on 
industrial concentration are matched to thirty-two industrial sectors identified by the survey. 
Three broader defined industry dummies are included to account for variations in the nature 
of what is being produced. 
  We also control for the use of shift work. Shift work is typically perceived as creating 
troublesome problems for the health, family life and on-the-job-safety of employees. Kostiuk 
(1990) shows that shift workers receive higher wages than other workers, a result consistent 
with the theory of compensating differentials. Hamermesh (1999) finds that unskilled workers 
are disproprotionately on night shifts.
16 This confirms that shift work is an inferior schedule. 
For workers with a low earnings potential, it is an opportunity to supplement their earnings. 
However, if the production technology to some extent requires both unskilled and skilled 
workers, the employer must ensure that skilled workers participate in shift work. As shift 
work is an inferior schedule, skilled workers will require a higher compensating differential 
than unskilled workers in order for them to accept shift work. Hence, this schedule is likely to 
be associated with increased intra-firm wage inequality between skilled and unskilled blue-
collar workers. 
  While numerous studies have documented an employer-size wage premium (e.g. 
Brown and Medoff 1989), the link between employer size and the (intra-firm) distribution of 
wages has been paid far less attention. Lluis (2007) finds that the returns to education do not 
depend on employer size in Canada, while they increase with employer size in the United 
States. Based on data from Taiwanese manufacturing firms, Tsou et al. (2006) show that the 
employer-size wage premium is larger for skilled workers than for unskilled workers. In light 
of these studies, we hypothesize that large-scale production is associated with increased intra-
firm wage dispersion. Oi (1983) argues that firm-specific human capital accumulation occurs 
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disporportionately at larger firms. Hence, if primarily skilled workers accumulate specific 
human capital, wage inequality between skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers will be 
higher in larger firms. The scale of production is taken into account by the number of 
employees in the establishment. An additional indicator is whether the establishment is a 
single establishment or part of a multi-establishment firm. Being part of a multi-establishment 
firm may create a large-scale production network. 
  Finally, we include variables for the employment shares of all blue-collar workers, 
skilled blue-collar workers, temporary workers, university graduates and women. Note that 
these controls help to interpret the empirical results (Osterman 2006). If the estimates show a 
link between teamwork and intra-firm wage dispersion, controlling for the structure of the 
workforce rules out a story in which team production leads establishments to demand more 
skilled workers and the need to acquire a larger share of skilled workers influences the wages 
paid by the establishment. The association between teamwork and wage dispersion will be 
rather driven by the specific responsibilites and tasks of skilled and unskilled team members 
within the establishment. As outlined in the the theoretical section, these responsibilities and 
tasks are likely to involve specific incentive issues resulting in higher skilled wages and 
possibly lower unskilled wages. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
Wages are usually not normally distributed but skewed and outliers often pose severe 
problems. Therefore, we use median regressions which reduce the influence of the residuals. 
This method minimizes the median of ordered squares of residuals. The procedure forms 
initial estimates from a weighted least squares of absolute residuals. Then the method applied 
estimates the median by taking the raw sum of absolute deviations around the unconditional 
median. The estimated coefficients minimize this function. The procedure estimates a 
constant and parameters that predict the median. The standard errors are computed from the 
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estimated weighted variance-covariance matrix of the coefficients. 
  Table 2 presents the regression results. The estimates shown in the first column do not 
take into account interaction effects while interaction variables are included in the estimates 
shown in the second column. Many of the control variables take statistically significant 
coefficients of the expected sign. Managerial profit sharing is associated with increased intra-
firm wage dispersion between skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. This association is 
stronger if no works council is present. Shift work and piece rates are also positive covariates 
of wage dispersion. Competition (low product market concentration) is associated with 
reduced wage dispersion. Further, the scale of production plays a role. Wage dispersion is 
higher in larger establishments and in establishments that are part of a multi-establishment 
firm. Moreover, the results on the variables for the structure of the workforce reveal an 
interesting pattern. The shares of women and temporary workers are negative covariates and 
the share of skilled blue-collar workers is a positive covariate of wage dispersion. 
  Turning to the variable of primary interest, the regression in the first column shows 
that the use of self-managed teams is positively related to intra-firm wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. This statistically significant result confirms our 
basic hypothesis. Team production involves an increased specialization of skilled and 
unskilled blue-collar workers resulting in increased wage dispersion. While skilled blue-collar 
workers have an increased responsibility for complex tasks, unskilled blue-collar workers 
may specialize in menial and routine tasks. The magnitude and significance of the coefficient 
on teams increases when including the interaction variables in the second regression. Most of 
the interaction variables take statistically significant coefficients of the expected sign. 
  In order to interpret the results, let us first consider an uncovered establishment that 
does not provide further training. Moreover, let us assume that the establishment is founded 
after 1960 but does not use a state-of-the-art production technology. In this establishment, the 
use of self-managed teams is associated with a more than 5 percentage point higher wage 
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inequality between skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. Taking this situation as a 
benchmark, we will now successively discuss the influence of each moderating variable. 
  The coefficient on employer-provided further training is significantly positive. This 
can be explained by the training gap between skilled and unskilled workers. If employer-
provided further training is complementary to the workers’ initial skills, qualified workers 
will receive a higher amount of training. This in turn widens the wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled workers. Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction of teams and 
employer-provided further training is significantly positive. If skilled workers play a crucial 
role in team production, the use of self-managed teams results in an even larger training gap. 
This reinforces the crucial role played by skilled team members resulting in even higher wage 
inequality. Hence, compared to the benchmark, team production has a stronger effect on intra-
firm wage disperion when coupled with employer-provided further training. Let us consider 
an establishment where the per head expenditure on further training amounts to 200 German 
marks. This is roughly the average amount in our sample. In this establishment, the use of 
self-managed teams is associated with an almost 7 percentage point higher wage dispersion 
between skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers.
17
  The coefficient on technologies of the most recent vintage is signficantly negative 
while the interaction of teamwork and technologies of the most recent vintage is significantly 
positive. This suggests that technological change has a rather deskilling effect on blue-collar 
workers when it is not coupled with increased responsibilities and expanded involvement in 
decision making. However, a modern production technology reinforces the skill-biased effect 
of team production. New production technologies may substitute for routine tasks done by 
unskilled team members and help skilled team members to even more focus on difficult tasks. 
Thus, compared to our benchmark, the effect of teamwork on wage dispersion is stronger in 
establishments with a state-of-the-art production technology. In these establishments, the use 
of self-managed teams is associated with an almost 12 percentage point higher wage 
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dispersion among blue-collar workers.  
  The coefficient on establishment age is statistically insignificant while the interaction 
of establishment age and team production is significantly negative. The negative interaction 
effect fits the hypothesis that older establishments with fixed routines and a more bureaucratic 
organization face difficulties in finding new pay policies that complement team production. 
The coefficient on the interaction variable is roughly of the same magnitude (but of opposite 
sign) as that for the basic teamwork variable. As a consequence, compared to the benchmark, 
the null hypothesis that team production has no influence on wage dispersion in 
establishments founded before 1960 cannot be rejected. Team production increases wage 
inequality in older establishments only if it coupled with employer-provided further training 
or a state-of-the-art technology. 
  While the coefficient on collective bargaining coverage is statistically insignificant, 
the interaction of collective bargaining coverage and team production takes a negative and 
significant coefficient. This pattern of results implies that the coverage by industry-level 
bargaining is not associated with a compressed wage structure when there is no teamwork. 
The minimum standards set by collective bargaining agreements appear to be less likely to be 
binding in establishments without team production. Moreover, while industry-level bargaining 
may tend to reduce wage dispersion, this effect can be offset by wage supplements for skilled 
workers paid unilaterally by the establishments. However, the minimum standards defined in 
collective bargaining agreements are more likely to be binding if there is team production. As 
outlined in the theoretical section, team production may not only require higher skilled wages 
but also lower unskilled wages. As collective bargaining agreements prevents employers from 
cutting unskilled wages, collective bargaining coverage leads to a compressed wage structure 
when there is team production. Or put slightly differently, team production has a less strong or 
even very small influence on wage dispersion in covered establishments. The coefficient on 
the interaction of collective bargaining coverage and teams is roughly of the same magnitude 
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(but of opposite sign) as that for the the basic team production variable. Hence, compared to 
the benchmark, the null hypothesis that team production has no effect on wage dispersion in 
covered establishments cannot be rejected. However, team production increases wage 
inequality even in a covered establishment if it is coupled with employer-provided further 
training or a production technology of the most recent vintage. 
  Finally, the presence of a works council is associated with lower wage inequality 
between skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers. The negative association is less strong if 
the establishment is covered by a collective bargaining agreement. This suggests that the 
coverage by industry-level bargaining reduces distributional conflicts and rent-seeking 
activities on the establishment level. However, the estimates show no statistically significant 
interaction of works councils and teamwork. Hence, the hypothesis that works councils 
oppose the rising wage inequality associated with teamwork is not supported. One explanation 
could be that there might be a second effect of establishment-level codetermination working 
in the opposite direction. Works councils provide a mechanism for building trust and 
negotiating change on the establishment level. This may contribute to increased flexibility in 
adjusting wages. This second effect can offset the first one. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Blue-collar workers are often viewed as a homogeneous group of low-skilled employees. 
However, blue-collar workers are those workers who are directly involved in skill-biased 
team production. Hence, it is to be important to distinguish between skilled and unskilled 
blue-collar workers. Our results show that the use of self-managed production teams is 
associated with increased intra-firm wage inequality between skilled and unskilled blue-collar 
workers. Moreover, we emphasize that moderating factors play an important role in the 
relationship between team production and intra-firm wage dispersion. The role of moderating 
factors has been paid little attention in studies on the wage effects of HPW practices. We find 
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that the link between team production and intra-firm wage dispersion is stronger when the 
production technology is of the most recent vintage and the employer provides further 
training. Team production interacts negatively with establishment age and collective 
bargaining coverage. The estimates provide no evidence that teamwork interacts with the 
presence of a works council. 
  We end this paper with some speculative remarks and a suggestion for further 
research. The negative interaction of teamwork with collective bargaining coverage may shed 
light on recent changes of the wage structure in Germany. While wage inequality has been 
rising in the United States since the 1970s, Germany experienced an increase in wage 
dispersion only since the 1990s. In the 1990s, the share of establishments covered by 
collective bargaining agreements declined substantially. This decline in collective bargaining 
coverage implies that skill-biased organizational change was likely to have a stronger 
influence on economy-wide wage inequality in the 1990s. In earlier decades, the economy-
wide wage effects of organizational change may have been less perceptible due to the higher 
density of collective bargaining coverage. There was a higher share of establishments where 
collective bargaining agrements prevented employers from adjusting the intra-firm wage 
structure to new modes of production. Exploring this hypothesis in more detail stands as 
important future research. 
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Table 1: Variable Definition and Descriptive Statistics (N = 499) 
   Mean, std.dev. 
Intra-firm wage dispersion  Difference (in %) between the highest effective hourly 
wage rate of a skilled blue-collar worker and the lowest 
effective hourly wage rate of an unskilled blue-collar 
worker in the establishment. 
36.55, 25.82 
Blue-collar workers  Unskilled and skilled blue-collar workers as a proportion 
of total employees. 
.630, .180 
Skilled blue-collar workers  Skilled blue-collar workers as a proportion of total 
employees. 
.378, .226 
Temporary workers  Temporary workers as a proportion of total employees.  .022, .062 
Women  Women as a proportion of total employees.  .274, .228 
University graduates  University and college graduates as a proportion of total 
employees. 
.036, .054 
Establishment size  Total employees in the establishment.  133.8, 194.3 
Single establishment  Dummy equals 1 if the establishment has no subsidiaries 
and is not itself a subsidiary. 
.621, .486 
Shift work  Dummy equals 1 if the establishment uses shift work.  .449, 498 
Sales concentration  Sales of the six largest companies in each industrial sector 
as a share of total sales in the sector. Official German 
statistics are matched to 32 industrial sectors identified by 
the survey. 
17.41, 14.51 
Establishment age  Dummy equals 1 if the establishment was created before 
1960. 
.653, .476 
Technology  Dummy equals 1 if the production technology is of the 
most recent vintage. 
.313, .464 
Managerial profit sharing  Dummy equals 1 if the executive managers have a profit-
sharing plan. 
.483, .500 
Profit sharing for employees  Dummy equals 1 if the establishment provides profit 
sharing to employees other than executives. 
.148, .356 
Piece rates  Dummy equals 1 if the establishment uses a piece rate in 
its production departments. 
.194, .396 
Training  Expenditures (in German marks) on employer provided 




Dummy equals 1 if the establishment is covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement. 
.663, .473 
Works council  Dummy equals 1 if a works council is present in the 
establishment. 
.617, .487 
Team  Dummy equals 1 if blue-collar workers are organized is 
production teams with expanded involvement in decision-
making and increased responsibility. 
.397, .490 
Team x establishment age  Works council interacted with establishment age.  .265, .442 
Team x training  Team interacted with training.  82.94, 209.8 
Team x technology  Team interacted with technology.  .130, .337 
Team x collective bargaining 
coverage 
Team interacted with collective bargaining coverage.  .255, .436 
Team x works council  Team interacted with works council.  .246, .431 
Works council x managerial 
profit sharing 
Works council interacted with managerial profit sharing.  .351, .478 
Works council x collective 
bargaining coverage 
Works council interacted with collective bargaining 
coverage. 
.499, .500 
Industry Dummies  3 broad defined industry dummies.   
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Table 2: Determinants of Intra-Firm Wage Dispersion Among Blue-Collar Workers 
 (1)  (2) 
Constant  17.99   (4.21)***  19.67   (6.40)*** 
Blue-collar workers  -1.566  (.40)  -2.285  (.86) 
Skilled blue-collar workers  7.266   (2.36)**  6.097   (2.91)*** 
Temporary workers  55.82   (6.03)***  54.62   (8.73)*** 
Women  8.201   (2.41)**  8.265   (3.67)*** 
University graduates  15.78   (1.30)  -.7067   (.09) 
Establishment size  .0160   (4.08)***  .0163   (6.16)*** 
Single establishment  -.9817  (.71)  -2.420  (2.64)*** 
Shift work  5.888   (3.84)***  4.647   (4.52)*** 
Product market concentration  .0799   (1.70)*  .1270   (3.97)*** 
Establishment age  -.7646  (.57)  1.505   (1.29) 
Technology  -1.193  (.88)  -3.945  (3.35)*** 
Managerial profit sharing  3.364   (2.45)**  5.662   (3.96)*** 
Profit sharing for employees  -1.683  (.91)  -1.875  (1.50) 
Piece rates  -.6298  (.38)  1.983   (1.78)* 
Training  .0020   (2.47)**  .0027   (6.15)*** 
Collective bargaining coverage  1.106   (.75)  1.185   (.74) 
Works council  -3.471  (2.20)**  -4.493  (2.37)** 
Teams  2.964   (2.28)**  5.206   (2.72)*** 
Team x establishment age  -----  -6.640  (3.62)*** 
Team x training  -----  .0083   (4.26)*** 
Team x technology  -----  6.471   (3.57)*** 
Team x collective bargaining coverage  -----  -5.016  (2.54)** 
Team x works council  -----  2.015   (1.04) 
Works council x managerial profit sharing  -----  -3.470  (1.94)* 
Works council x collective agreement  -----  3.513   (1.79)* 
Industry Dummies  Included  Included 
Pseudo R
2 .0763 .0854 
N  499 499 
Method: LAD. T-statistics are in parentheses. * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** at the .05 
level; *** at the .01 level. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Note that production workers are typically in blue-collar occupations (Berman et al. 1998). 
2 Note that this finding applies to heterogeneity in skills and abilities. In contrast, there appears to be 
no consistent link between racial or gender diversity and team performance (Kochan et al. 2003). 
3 Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) provide a general theoretical analysis showing that improved 
communication results in an increased specialization of high-ability and low-ability agents. We apply 
this idea to the division of labor within teams. 
4 Winter (2004) presents a stylized model that differential rewards may even be optimal if teams are 
homogeneous. In the model, the team members’ efforts increase the chance that the team succeeds. If 
workers shirk, the probability of success is low but strictly positive. It is optimal for the firm that an 
arbitrarily chosen team member receives a larger reward for good team performance than the other 
members of the team. If the reward is sufficiently large, the dominant strategy of the chosen team 
member is to exert high effort (regardless if there is a low or a high probability that the team 
succeeds). Assuming that team members’ efforts are complementary, this in turn induces high effort 
even by those who only receive smaller rewards. It appears to be reasonable to hypothesize that in 
heterogenous teams high-ability team members will receive these larger rewards as they have a 
stronger influence on the success of the team. 
5 See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for a classic efficiency wage model. 
6 Baker et al. (1988) provide a discussion on objective and subjective performance measures. 
7 Heywood et al. (2007) stress that performance appraisals are not only important to detect shirking on 
the job but also to monitor absence from the job. 
8 See also Dolan et al. (2007) for a discussion on procedural justice. 
9 Flexible automation in the automobile industry is a typical example (Pil and MacDuffie 1996). 
Flexible automation is used to generate more product variety and to facilitate rapid changes from one 
model to another. This requires flexible workers who perform a variety of complex tasks and are 
accustomed to modifying work methods. Moreover, if (minor) modifications in the software programs 
for robots are carried out locally, flexible production lends itself to increased involvement in making 
incremental process changes. 
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10 Although centralized collective bargaining in Germany is coming under increasing threat, the share 
of establishments covered by firm-specific agreements is very small. Addison et al. (2007) report for 
the year 2004 that 41 percent of all West German establishments were covered by industry-level 
agreements and only 2 percent were covered by firm-level agreements. Instead of switching from 
industry-level bargaining to firm-level bargaining, employers tend to escape collective bargaining 
completely. Since the 1990s there is a substantial decline in collective bargaining coverage. 
11 This may explain why the empirical literature on this topic is inconclusive. Also, studies for 
Germany report very mixed results. While Stephan and Gerlach (2005) find that collective bargaining 
is associated with reduced wage dispersion, Hubler and Meyer (2001) obtain the opposite result. 
12 However, due to data limitations, their control group includes both establishments without teams 
and establishments that already have teams. 
13 Similarly, Helper et al. (2002) use an index of employee involvement practices to examine the wage 
effect of those practices. They find that employee involvement is associated with higher wages for 
blue-collar workers in the auto-supply industry. However, Helper et al. (2002) do not consider the 
effects of employee involvement on wage inequality within establishments. 
14 Note that this information is only available from the fourth wave of the panel. Only wage dispersion 
among blue-collar workers was addressed. 
15 Descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses are not weighted. The sampling weights available in 
the data set only correct for stratification by establishment size. Thus, using the weights in multivariate 
regressions will probably result in biased estimates. A more appropriate method is to control for the 
two stratification characteristics establishment size and industry in the regressions (Winship and 
Radbill 1994). To relate descriptive statistics to regression results, they are also not weighted. 
16 Similarly, Jirjahn (2007) finds that establishments with a high share of unskilled blue-collar workers 
are more likely to use shift work. These establishments also have a higher share of shift workers. 
17 This effect is obtained by the following calculation: 5.206 + 0.0083 x 200 = 6.866. Similar 
calculations apply for the other moderating variables. 
 